

### **The Maximal Standard**

#### *The significance of the Holocaust*

Discussion about political violence today is marked above all by considerable avoidance of the word 'genocide'. This is partly for political reasons: when states and international organizations acknowledge genocide, it implies legal and political action. However the tendency also derives from the theoretical confusion surrounding the concept. This confusion and the corresponding 'genocide'-avoidance come from three apparently diverse but really complementary sources. The first is the erection of 'the Holocaust' as a maximal standard that other episodes must reach if they are to be recognized: not surprisingly, they mostly fail. The second is the deployment of 'ethnic cleansing' as a concept of sub-genocidal violence, to which the rejected cases are accommodated. 'Ethnic cleansing' comes without genocide's definite legal prohibition, but it also offers less of a theoretical challenge: it is a minimal, euphemistic term often adopted for reasons of intellectual as well as political avoidance. The third reason is the proliferation of 'genocide' terms in official, popular and scholarly discourse, so that many forms of genocide are recognized by different names. In this and the succeeding chapters, I shall examine each of these tendencies in turn, proposing how the issues they involve - principally variation in genocides, and the relationships between killing and other forms of coercion - can be understood better within the framework of genocide theory.

### **Holocaust 'uniqueness'**

The understanding of genocide, born of the Nazi era and defined in its aftermath, remains in the shadow of what has come to be called the Holocaust. As we saw, scholarly attention is overwhelmingly dominated by this topic. Even so it is still less unbalanced than public debate and high school education, in which the Holocaust has assumed a position of overriding importance, universally commemorated and increasingly the dominant theme of the Second World War. In this debate, recognition of other cases - historical, like Armenia, and contemporary, such as Rwanda - often depends on establishing a connection to the Holocaust. Debate about them is regularly conducted in terms of their similarity. The result of this bias is considerable distortion of the Holocaust's meaning, which has affected academic genocide studies in often polemical debates about its 'uniqueness' and comparability. These debates have gone so far that protagonists have accused each other of 'denial', on one side of the Holocaust - the significance of which is diminished without 'uniqueness' - and on the other in relation to other cases - of less significance if the Holocaust is uniquely murderous. Hence in the 'jingoistic/ideological wars' in genocide studies, to which Charny referred,

there is a disquieting pattern of claims of the "incomparable uniqueness" of the Holocaust and a good deal of political power used in many places in academia, museums, and communities to back up these claims by pushing down and out nonadherents. No less disturbing, many of the counterclaims - however justified in epistemological and moral intent to place the genocides of *all* peoples on the same level of tragedy and evil - go

on to minimize the horror of the Holocaust and display a nasty lack of reverence for the victims ... .<sup>1</sup>

While there is no denying the damaging moral and political effects of 'wars' about genocides, it is their implications for understanding that concern this chapter. As Dirk Moses pointed out, 'the primacy of the victims' point of view' reflects group traumas that 'block conceptual development' as well as mutual recognition.<sup>2</sup> And Holocaust studies have often taken academic understanding further from the generic concept of genocide as a crime towards an ever more refined grasp of the Nazi case. That is to say, while Lemkin advanced a general concept that was legal in purpose and sociological in character, Holocaust studies have for the most part remained relentlessly historical in a narrow sense. Of course, the richness of Holocaust research can be used to illuminate the general understanding of genocide. But when no adequate conceptual framework informs research, it either remains simply particularistic or leads to *ad hoc* comparisons between cases in which one becomes the standard for others.

Thus protagonists in the 'uniqueness' debates have tended to trade case-to-case comparisons without advancing a general framework that could explain them all. A prime exemplar is Katz, whose work makes explicit the negative idealization involved in claims of Holocaust 'uniqueness'. In order to render the Holocaust the *sole* historical case of genocide, Katz not only departed from Lemkin, as we saw he acknowledged, but also grossly misinterpreted him. Quoting Lemkin's

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<sup>1</sup> Charny, 'Foreword', p. x. Emphasis in original.

<sup>2</sup> A. Dirk Moses, 'Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the "Racial Century"', p. 10.

definition of the Nazi genocide as a 'coordinated plan of different actions aimed at the destruction of the essential foundations of life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves', he commented: 'This and this alone, understood as the complete biological extinction of the Jewish people, defines what one today calls the Holocaust. Thus, to define the term in a way other than that which applied particularly to the Holocaust (i.e. that relativizes or loses sight of the distinctiveness of the Holocaust context) seems not only arbitrary but perverse, both logically and phenomenologically.'<sup>3</sup> However what is genuinely perverse is to take Lemkin's manifestly universal concept of the destruction of national groups and reduce it to the *biological* extinction of the *Jewish* people - as though the general concept no longer held meaning.

In his argument for the uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust experience, Katz conceded arguments based on the numbers of victims or the proportion of the Jewish population murdered by the Nazis - in these terms, evidently, the experience *was* matched by other awful cases - but drew a line concerning the uniqueness of the Nazis' intention to murder every Jew in the world. This in turn was the cue for critics to argue not only that more, or a greater proportion, of other populations have been killed, but also that murdering every last Jew was not the Nazis' intention, or that the Nazis also attacked groups such as Gypsies with similar aims, or that other perpetrators also had comparable intentions.<sup>4</sup> The problem is not only that, as Charny suggested, this debate sometimes exceeded morally appropriate bounds. It is also that it misplaced the real question about

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<sup>3</sup> Katz, *The Holocaust*, p. 130.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, D.E. Stannard, 'Uniqueness as Denial', and Ian Hancock, 'Responses to the Porrajmos'.

killing in genocide. Whether or not the Nazis actually aimed to kill every single Jew, even in occupied Europe, let alone the world, their generally genocidal policies involved the sharply distinctive attitudes that Lemkin noted towards the different occupied peoples. So how should we characterize these differences? At one end of the Nazi policy spectrum, there was relatively little direct killing of peoples 'related by blood' to Germans and hence 'deemed capable of being Germanized'; in the middle range, the 'peoples not thus related by blood' were condemned to servile status and liable to extensive killing; while at the furthest extreme, Jews, Gypsies and the disabled had no place in the Nazi order and became, finally, the objects of systematic mass murder. If we can draw a significant line through these patterns, it should surely be between killing as a *means* of the general social destruction of groups, and killing as an *end* of policy in itself - when systematic physical extermination became a policy goal. In this sense, Nazi policies towards disabled people, Polish elites, Jews, Soviet prisoners of war and Gypsies all *became* simply murderous - exterminatory - at various stages of the Second World War. However policies towards these groups were not equally murderous in all stages of Nazi rule, warfare and occupation. If the proposed line is drawn, it divides the Final Solution phase of Nazi anti-Jewish policy from earlier phases in which this goal was not adopted. We cannot teleologically re-read the earlier phases under the rubric of the final phase, since policy development was incremental, contextual and reactive.<sup>5</sup>

Certainly, the shift towards attempted physical extermination - through the simple murder of as many individuals defined as belonging to the categories as

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<sup>5</sup> Christopher Browning, *The Path to Genocide*, Chapter 1.

possible - was a striking development. No wonder that much historical effort has gone in the case of the Jews (but surprisingly not other groups) into defining the point at which a decision was made, if indeed there was a single decision, and how far Hitler conceived this policy in the years before he implemented it. But whatever the outcomes of these investigations, it is surely valid to examine the course of anti-Jewish policy over the whole period of Nazism's existence and rule, as a single developing process. The definition of Jewry as an enemy and the aim of destroying its real and imputed social power were consistent throughout the history of the Nazi party. In this sense it always had genocidal aims towards the Jews, manifested in many policies, although the policy of physical extermination was concretely adopted only in 1941. So while it is important to signal the development of extermination policies, this was the final phase of a longer genocidal history. Likewise, Jewish extermination was only one thrust among several of this kind. As Christopher Browning put it:

If the Nazi regime had suddenly ceased to exist in the first half of 1941, its most notorious achievements in human destruction would have been the so-called euthanasia killing of seventy to eighty thousand German mentally ill and the systematic murder of the Polish intelligentsia. If the regime had disappeared in the spring of 1942, its historical infamy would have rested on the "war of destruction" against the Soviet Union. The mass death of some two million prisoners of war in the first nine months of that period would have stood out even more prominently than the killing of approximately one-half million Jews in that same period.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. ix.

Eventually the intensity of Nazi anti-Semitism, the industrialized nature of the later mass killing and the greater final total of Jewish victims combined to leave Jews pre-eminent in the historical memory - and scholarly assessments - of Nazi murderousness. Yet this murderousness had many targets, intertwined in practice and in the experience of victims. If Nazi murder-policies require distinctive concepts to represent them, then extermination policies should be seen as intensifications of generally genocidal policies, conceived in the 1920s and implemented after 1933, and manifestations of genocidal war waged from 1939.

Thus the meaning of 'the Holocaust' can only be grasped in the light of genocidal policies and war which were *multi-targeted* at a range of victim groups, among which the Jews were ideologically and in the end statistically pre-eminent. Katz's approach typifies, David Stannard suggested, a tautological strand of scholarly argument: 'Uniqueness advocates *begin* by defining genocide (or the Holocaust or the Shoah) in terms of what they already believe to be experiences undergone only by Jews. After much research it is then "discovered" - *mirabile dictu* - that the Jewish experience was unique.'<sup>7</sup> Or, if other genocides are admitted, such criteria are used to distinguish the Jewish case as qualitatively worse. For example, Daniel Goldhagen argued that unlike other genocides which 'occurred in the context of some pre-existing realistic conflict (territorial, class, ethnic, or religious)', the Holocaust was motivated by 'an absolutely fantastical' German hatred of the Jews without a basis in reality: 'demonizing German racial anti-Semitism ... because of its *fantastical* construction of Jewry, demanded, unlike in

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<sup>7</sup> Stannard, 'Uniqueness', p. 272, emphasis in original. In Katz's case, this tautology is to be pursued through three volumes!

other genocides, the *total* extermination of the Jews.<sup>8</sup> He was seemingly unaware that fantastical ideas of the enemy-victim group are common in genocides; moreover they do not always lead to total extermination, although there have in other cases too, such as Rwanda.

The name 'Holocaust' was, as we have seen, a later invention. 'When I was growing up,' Phillip Lopate noted,

we never spoke of a Holocaust; we said "concentration camps", "the gas chambers", "six million Jews", "what the Nazis did". It might seem an improvement over these awkward phrases to use a single, streamlined term. And yet to put any label on that phenomenal range of suffering serves to restrict, to conventionalize, to tame. As soon as the term "Holocaust" entered common circulation, around the mid-sixties, it made me uncomfortable. It had a self-important, strutting air - a vulgarly neologistic ring, combined with a self-conscious archaic sound, straining as it did for a Miltonic biblical solemnity that brought to mind such quaint cousins as Armageddon, Behemoth, and Leviathan.<sup>9</sup>

'What disturbs me finally', he commented, 'is the exclusivity of the singular usage, *the* Holocaust, which seems to cut the event off from all others and to diminish, if not demean, the mass slaughters of other people - or, for that matter, previous tragedies in Jewish history. ... The image of the Holocaust is too overbearing, too hot to tolerate subtle distinctions. In its life as a rhetorical figure, the Holocaust is a bully.'<sup>10</sup> The fact remains, however, that the name 'Holocaust' is now so

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<sup>8</sup> Daniel Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, p. 414. Emphasis in original.

<sup>9</sup> Phillip Lopate, 'Resistance to the Holocaust', p. 287.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 287-8.

thoroughly established that it is very difficult to dispense with. In the light of its comprehensive, multi-targeted nature, perhaps *the Nazi Holocaust* would be an appropriate modification of the term. This proposal will, however, meet strong resistance from those for whom the Holocaust's Jewish character defines it. Yet as Irving Louis Horowitz argued, 'To emphasise distinctions between peoples by arguing for the uniqueness of anti-Semitism is a profound mistake; it reduces any possibility of a unified political and human posture on the meaning of genocide or the Holocaust.'<sup>11</sup>

### **The Holocaust standard in comparative study**

Gavriel Rosenfeld, in an attempt to reconcile the debate, argued sympathetically that 'uniqueness' was a response to the historicization and politicization of the Holocaust: 'the widespread adoption of uniqueness by scholars is best understood as part of a self-consciously *defensive* response to the perceived attempts by others to diminish the event for apologetic or revisionist purposes'.<sup>12</sup> He nevertheless concluded that

the debate has raised important questions concerning the utility of the uniqueness concept. In many ways, controversy has resulted from the concept's very ambiguity. "Uniqueness" not only suffers from a lack of linguistic clarity - it suggests both "unprecedented" and "unrepeatable" - but yields very different conclusions depending on the analytical perspective: historical, philosophical, theological, and so on. ...

Furthermore, "uniqueness" is a concept of questionable utility given the

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<sup>11</sup> Quoted, *ibid.*, p. 289.

misunderstanding it has provoked as a qualitative concept carrying a moral judgement. ... Given the drawbacks of uniqueness, might the concept not be replaced by a less attention-grabbing but more precise term, such as "distinctiveness" or "particularity"?<sup>13</sup>

This might seem no more than an agreement with Charny's uncontroversial maxim: 'all cases of genocide are similar and different, special and unique, and appropriately subject to comparative analysis.'<sup>14</sup> However it is clear that Rosenfeld's kind of Holocaust distinctiveness continued to render it immune to generalization - or what he called 'historicization', namely 'turning into a comprehensible event that could be subjected to rational historical analysis, often with the help of generalizing theories.'<sup>15</sup> But what was the problem with this approach, to which every other historical event would be subjected? It appeared this was an objection in principle: the mystical, 'incomprehensible' core of the Holocaust could not, even should not, be explained. Rosenfeld claimed that none of the five main concepts used to 'historicize' - totalitarianism, fascism, functionalism, modernity and genocide - 'have succeeded in integrating the Holocaust into a general explanatory framework without substantially marginalizing its significance.'<sup>16</sup> I shall restrict my comments to his critique of genocide scholars' 'goal of "contextualizing the Holocaust into Genocide Studies" by subjecting it to rigorous comparative analysis.' These scholars argued, according to Rosenfeld, 'that the Holocaust was not qualitatively different from

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<sup>12</sup> G. D. Rosenfeld, 'The Politics of Uniqueness', p. 30. Emphasis in original.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 47-8.

<sup>14</sup> Charney, 'Foreword', xi.

<sup>15</sup> Rosenfeld, 'The Politics', p. 30. I leave aside, for the moment, Rosenfeld's understandable concern about certain forms of politicization - concern that can also be extended, as he acknowledges, to 'instrumental usages' of 'uniqueness' itself (p. 44).

other episodes of mass murder in human history ... . These scholars also focused attention upon the similarities between the Nazis' persecution of the Jews and other "inferior" groups ... .<sup>17</sup> Rosenfeld acknowledged that '[s]uch efforts to analyze the Holocaust as an example of genocide have contributed greatly to the broader cause of historical understanding.'<sup>18</sup> Yet he concluded that '[o]verall, however, the project has been hampered by the absence of a widely accepted definition of the term "genocide" itself. The inability of scholars to agree upon which groups should be regarded as the perpetrators and which the victims has made it difficult to see how the Holocaust relates to other episodes of mass murder that may or may not be similar in character. As a result, the Holocaust continues to resist historicization as an example of genocide.'<sup>19</sup>

This critique was curious: if comparing the Holocaust to other genocides had contributed to the cause of historical understanding, what was its problem? And, granted obviously that there were divergent definitions and debates, were any of the differences so severe as to prevent any informed comparison of the Holocaust with other genocides? Actually, as we have seen, definitions have tended to converge towards a relatively narrow concept, recognizing mass killing against any kind of group as genocide. Whatever the problems of this concept, comparisons in its terms are perfectly feasible. There may be continuing debate about the Holocaust as a case of genocide, but it is hardly the case that it 'continues to resist historicization'.

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 32-3.

There was however a paradoxical element of truth in Rosenfeld's observations. Comparison has misled precisely because it has substituted a *Holocaust standard* for a coherent conception of genocide. The problem is not too much but too little generalization. *Ad hoc* comparisons have often focussed on secondary differences of limited significance, reinforcing an overall incoherence in genocide studies. A collection of 'comparative' essays on Holocaust 'uniqueness' included many examples of this flawed approach.<sup>20</sup> Thus Robert F. Melson analyzed three dimensions on which 'the Armenian case differed from the Holocaust':

First, the Young Turks were largely motivated by an ideology of nationalism, whereas the Nazis were moved by an ideology heavily influenced by social Darwinism and racism. Second, the Armenians were a territorial group concentrated in the eastern *vilayets* of the empire, and they had historical claims to the land. In contrast, the Jews were not a territorial group. To destroy the Jews, the Nazis had to formulate a policy of genocide that transcended Germany and even Europe. Lastly, the method of destruction of the Armenians centred on their exportation, shooting and starvation, whereas in the Holocaust the majority of Nazi victims perished in death camps. This is not to deny that a large percentage of Nazi victims also perished by shooting and starvation in the manner of their Armenian predecessors.<sup>21</sup>

It is striking that all three points were misleading. Clearly social Darwinism and racism were important in Nazi ideology - but the *National Socialist German Workers Party* was hardly uninfluenced by nationalism! The idea that 'the Jews were not a territorial group' is belied by their centuries of residence in certain

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<sup>20</sup> Alan S. Rosenbaum, ed., *Is the Holocaust Unique?*

countries, regions and localities of eastern Europe and the attachment of Jewish village-dwellers to their land. The significance of this 'territoriality' for Nazi anti-Jewish policy is demonstrated by their determination to remove the Jews from their homelands. Melson conceded that many Nazi victims also perished by the 'exportation, shooting and starvation' that Turkish victims had suffered. And while the new methodology of the extermination camps was shocking, the end of destruction was the same. This flawed point underlined the fact that unguided by a developed general concept of genocide, discussion was focussing on historically secondary issues, the differences over which were overstated.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, another Armenian scholar, Vakahn Dadrian, produced similarly faulty comparisons. In creating a picture of Armenian distinctiveness, his claims also distorted Jewish history. Jews and Armenians, he argued, 'emerge as victims for opposite reasons. The Armenians were destroyed in their natural homeland - their ancestral territories - in historic Armenia. ... In the Jewish case, the victims were destroyed as an immigrant population by the rulers of the host country.' This claim ironically, and surely unintentionally, endorsed Hitler's rationale for destroying the Jews. The real purpose of Dadrian's comparison, of course, was to emphasise Armenian claims to 'their natural homeland - their ancestral territories'.

The reader may weary of these critiques, but their point is quite central: *ad hoc* comparisons of other cases with the Holocaust tend to reproduce a narrow exterminatory conception, and get caught up in secondary features, so blurring core similarities. (Nor is this tendency confined to Armenian scholars.) In order

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<sup>21</sup> Robert F. Melson, 'The Armenian Genocide as Precursor and Prototype', pp. 119-32.

to understand other genocides, therefore, the imperative is not to compare them to the Holocaust - which as a specific episode was necessarily unique in many respects - but to interpret them in terms of a coherent general conception. We don't need a standard that steers all discussion towards a maximal concept of industrial extermination, a standard that distorts even the Nazi genocide against the Jews. We do need a coherent, generic, sociological concept of genocide that can make sense of a range of historical experiences.

### **Holocausts and genocides**

Even when mystifying arguments about 'uniqueness' were cast aside, the nexus of historical empiricism and special pleading that produced it continued to negatively influence comparative research. More moderate versions of exceptionalism remained pervasive. Thus Yehuda Bauer influentially claimed that the Nazi anti-Jewish campaign represented an 'extreme' form of genocide and for this reason deserved the separate designation 'Holocaust'.<sup>23</sup> His case seemed more reasonable because he generalized the term 'holocaust' as an ideal type that could apply to other genocides (for example the Armenians) and allowed that holocausts could recur: 'Events happen because they are possible. If they were possible once, they are possible again. In that sense the Holocaust is not unique, but a warning for the future.'<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 130.

<sup>23</sup> Yehuda Bauer, *A History of the Holocaust*, p. 332.

<sup>24</sup> Bauer, cited by Rosenbaum, *Is the Holocaust Unique?*, p. xxi.

The wider remit of the term 'holocaust' gives the argument greater plausibility. As Stannard, an opponent of Holocaust 'uniqueness', polemically contended:

as for restricting use of the word "holocaust" to references having to do with the experiences of the Jews under the Nazis, that copyright was filed at least three centuries too late. Although "The Holocaust", in what has become conventional usage, clearly applies exclusively to the genocide that was perpetrated by the Nazis against their various victims, "holocaust", in more general parlance, as a term to describe mass destruction or slaughter, belongs to anyone who cares to use it. It is a very old word, after all ...<sup>25</sup>

However the generalization of 'holocausts', which writers like Stannard embrace in order to apply the term to other episodes (in his work, the destruction of native peoples became 'the American Holocaust'<sup>26</sup>) adds little to a social scientific vocabulary. Its meaning is too loose to have much value as a general term for 'extreme' genocide - surely an oxymoronic idea. To distinguish 'holocausts' from 'ordinary' genocides only permits the idea of hyper-genocide, in some sense worse than 'mere' genocide, to be extended to selected other cases. It is not clear what scientific purpose such classification serves, since the difference of exterminatory from 'ordinary' genocidal killing is not always easy to determine, and it develops from and deepens genocide. Nor, of course, is it very significant to the victims: as Lopate remarked of the Holocaust, 'The fact that one's group was not targeted for extermination *in toto* is a serious distinction, but hardly much consolation to the Gypsies, homosexuals, radicals, Poles, Slavs, etc., whom the Nazis did wipe

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<sup>25</sup> Stannard, 'Uniqueness', p. 273.

<sup>26</sup> David E. Stannard, *American Holocaust: The Conquest of the New World*.

out.<sup>27</sup> It seems more plausible to see extermination as a particular type of genocidal policy, which when pursued successfully leads to more comprehensive physical as well as general social destruction of a target-group. The extent and forms of extermination are important questions, but hardly separate studies from that of genocide.

Thus although the sterile 'uniqueness' debate has been transcended, the debilitating effect of the Holocaust paradigm remains. Its dominant role has strongly influenced the tendency to narrow genocide to killing which has now spread throughout the social sciences. Just as the Holocaust has been over-interpreted in terms of its final, exterminatory, phase, so genocide generally has been narrowed to extermination. Charny's reductive view that 'genocide in a generic sense is mass killing' has been widely reinvented in new definitions. Levene advanced a view of genocide as an 'actual event' of mass murder, defined by a state's 'systematic, *en masse* physical elimination' of an 'aggregate population' perceived as threatening to it.<sup>28</sup> In Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr's textbook on ethnic conflict, '[g]enocide is mass murder carried out by or with the complicity of political authorities and directed at distinct communally defined groups.'<sup>29</sup> Mann used the term to refer only to the most extreme murderous politics, involving both 'total cleansing' *and* 'premeditated mass killing'. In his comprehensive analytical framework, genocide was a narrow rather than a broad term, referring only to deliberate, systematic and total

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<sup>27</sup> Lopate, 'Resistance', p. 292.

<sup>28</sup> Levene, *Genocide*, Vol. 1, pp. 50, 36.

<sup>29</sup> Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, p. 222.

extermination.<sup>30</sup> Thus in the Nazi case, Mann ended up embracing - empirically - the uniqueness advocates' restriction of genocide to the Jews. Their extermination, he wrote, 'was clearly genocide, the only really large genocide attempted by the Nazis.'<sup>31</sup> For him, the Nazis' killing of mentally retarded and disturbed Germans 'was erratic, leaving too many alive to be genocidal'. The Nazis did develop the intent to murder Gypsies, but since it 'was thwarted by an elusive quarry', with 200,000-260,000 deaths this was only 'attempted genocide'.<sup>32</sup> The mass murder of Polish elites was only 'politicide'; combined with the 'segregation' and 'wild deportations' of other Poles, the 'intended outcome was not quite genocide'. Although the numbers of Soviet prisoner-of-war and civilian victims were 'horrific', 'This was not quite genocide because there were too many Soviet Slavs to contemplate killing them all.'<sup>33</sup>

If only total extermination is now admitted, how should we describe the situations that would constitute genocide on Lemkin's or the Convention's definition, but which fall outside this newly narrowed remit? Officials, journalists and scholars have been quick to reinvent genocide in new terms. The most widely applied - but least coherent or useful - is 'ethnic cleansing', discussed in the next chapter. But this is only one of a wide range of new terms, and in the following chapter I argue that, in order for them to be useful, they need to be reintegrated in a genocide framework.

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<sup>30</sup> Mann, *The Dark Side*, Table 1.1, 'The Extent of Cleansing and Violence in Intergroup Relations', p. 12. Curiously he later refers to 'systematic genocide' (p. 149), which seems (in his terms) an oxymoron, although it does raise the interesting possibility that some genocide may after all not be 'systematic'.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 185.

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 186.